ASML Holding N.V.

• monetization model: One-time lithography system sales plus recurring service/field options/upgrades/spares; no subscription/SaaS. (ASML FY2024 20-F, Business & Note 8; asml.com ; EDGAR CIK 0000937966; accession UNKNOWN in model.) ASML files 20-F/6-K, not 10-K/10-Q.
• revenue mix: FY2024 net system sales ~77%, net service/field option sales ~23% of total net sales. (20-F FY2024, Note 8/segment note.)
• who pays: Foundry, logic, and memory semiconductor fabs via capital equipment budgets. (20-F FY2024, Business.)
• margin_value_capture: FY2024 gross margin 51.3%; value accrues in EUV/High-NA monopoly and installed-base service. (20-F FY2024, MD&A.)

• customer classes: Semiconductor Fabs - IDM Buyers

ASML does not report multiple GAAP operating segments; the 20-F presents one reportable segment and breaks revenue into system sales and services/field option sales. That split matters because ASML is effectively a “razor/razorblade” business: it sells a scarce, extremely expensive lithography tool and then earns recurring service/upgrade revenue on the installed base.

ASML FY2024 revenue mix, as filed:

The same filing’s comparative FY2023 data shows total net sales of €27,559 million, with system sales of €21,227 million and services/field option sales of €6,332 million. That implies FY2024 total net sales growth of approximately 2.6% year over year. The mix stayed nearly constant at roughly 77/23.

The revenue mix also has a product-technology dimension. ASML groups lithography systems into EUV, ArFi immersion, ArF dry, KrF, and i-line. From the quarterly 6-K disclosures, FY2024 unit shipments can be derived as follows:

This unit count is the basis for the worked ASP calculation in Section 2.4. Because the 20-F does not provide the same year-sum unit table on a single page in the copy I used, the 418-unit figure is derived from the quarterly 6-K disclosures rather than quoted as a 20-F line item. If your downstream parser requires a single reported line, mark the exact 20-F unit count as needs primary source validation.

ASML is paid by semiconductor manufacturers, including integrated device manufacturers, foundries, and memory producers. The 20-F’s business description identifies the customer set as leading semiconductor manufacturers and specifically names TSMC, Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron, and Intel among the customers in its disclosed market description. The company’s revenue comes from:

1. System sales — a capital equipment sale at very high ticket prices. The filed revenue and derived unit count imply a blended average selling price of roughly €52 million per lithography system for FY2024, but this is a blended figure across EUV and DUV; EUV tools sell at much higher prices than the blended ASP.

1. Services and field option sales — maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, relocations, productivity enhancements, metrology/software options, and applications support. These revenues recur over the life of the installed tool.

Because the installed base is long-lived and process-qualification-dependent, service revenue is not optional for customers: a fab cannot simply drop the service contract without risking yield and uptime on a tool that may be the single most expensive machine in the fab.

ASML FY2024 profitability as filed:

These margins are high for semiconductor capital equipment and are consistent with a sole-source supplier at the leading edge. In contrast, competitor filings show that etch/deposition-focused suppliers operate with narrower gross margins, though direct margin comparability is limited by product mix.

This is a filing-supported, derived unit economics calculation.

The 20-F discloses that ASML’s customers include semiconductor manufacturers across the industry:

• Foundries — customer example named in filing: TSMC.
• Logic/integrated device manufacturers — customer examples named in filing: Intel, Samsung.
• Memory manufacturers — customer examples named in filing: Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron.

These buyer archetypes have different lithography purchase patterns:

• Leading-edge foundry/logic buyers buy EUV and High-NA EUV for sub-7 nm and sub-3 nm nodes.
• Memory buyers buy both EUV and DUV immersion; memory demand is historically more cyclical.
• Mature-node and specialty fabs buy DUV dry, KrF, and i-line tools.

ASML’s 20-F identifies a concentrated customer base. The precise customer-concentration percentage for 2024 is in the filing and should be referenced directly if it is material to an investment decision. Third-party summaries that quote a different figure should not be used unless they are traceable to the 20-F.

Lithography is a qualified process step. A fab cannot easily switch suppliers on an existing node without re-qualifying masks, resists, overlay models, and process recipes. That creates high switching costs and makes ASML’s installed base a recurring-service annuity. The service and field option revenue of €6,468 million in FY2024 is the monetization of that installed-base lock-in.

The longer the tool lasts inside a fab, the more service revenue ASML captures. This is why ASML disclosures often emphasize installed-base growth, not just quarterly unit shipments.

Calc 1 — The EUV capacity ceiling (the number that gates the AI industry).

Low-NA EUV capacity ≈ 65 systems (2026) → +30% ≈ 85 (2027, "nearly sold out") → investigating +30% ≈ 110 (2028). DUV-immersion ≈ 130 (2026) → +30% ≈ 169 (2027). Source: CEO Christophe Fouquet, Q2 2026 EX-99.1. A TSMC/Samsung/Intel can commit $25–40B to a new fab, but the number of EUV scanners they can install is determined entirely by ASML's (and Zeiss's) output — leading-edge capacity growth is supply-capped, not capex-capped.

Calc 2 — The H2 2026 revenue step-up (inflection math).

H1 2026 net sales = €8,767M + €9,326M = €18,093M. FY2026 guide = €43–45B ⇒ H2 2026 = €24.9–26.9B (midpoint €25.9B), i.e. H2 runs ~+43% above H1 — the back-half step-up that drives the +35% YoY guide. This is the capacity ramp + High-NA + service all compounding at once.

Calc 3 — The recurring installed-base annuity.

Installed Base Management (service + field options) sales = €2,488M (Q1) → €2,762M (Q2) = 29.6% of Q2 net sales; annualized ≈ €11B of high-margin, contractual revenue that scales with the ~200+ EUV + thousands-of-DUV installed base. This is the counter-cyclical toll that smooths system cycles.

Calc 4 — Cost of the moat (R&D intensity).

FY2025 R&D €4,699M ÷ revenue €32,667M = 14.4% of revenue to defend a 100% monopoly — the annual reinvestment no rival can match (Nikon's entire lithography segment is smaller than ASML's R&D budget).

Calc 5 — Margin trajectory = pricing power, not just volume.

Gross margin: FY2025 52.8% (€17,258M ÷ €32,667M) → Q1 2026 53.0% → Q2 2026 54.0% → Q3 guide 55–57% → FY2026 guide 54–56%. Rising GM while revenue accelerates +35% is the empirical signature of a toll with pricing power.

Calc 6 — Blended system ASP (with the mix caveat).

Q2 2026: 86 new systems on system sales ≈ €9,326M − €2,762M = €6,564M ⇒ ~€76M blended ASP. This mixes low-ASP DUV (€20–60M) with EUV (public estimates $200–300M low-NA, ~$350M High-NA, up to $400–500M fully loaded); the EUV/high-NA mix, not the DUV volume, is the value driver.

\[

\text{Blended system ASP} = \frac{€21,795 \text{ million}}{418 \text{ systems}} = €52.1 \text{ million per system}

\]