ins-$3.5M · 13F 13+/11-×0.0 · short↑0.37
Current snapshotAPLD
Power Infrastructure · Physical AI
Power Infrastructure exposure in Physical AI.
Applied Digital builds and leases MW-scale, high-power-density AI data centers on a repeatable shell model (customers supply servers under 15-yr take-or-pay leases) — a direct toll road on hyperscaler compute demand. 1.4GW contracted CITL with only ~100-175MW live shows the ramp is early; pricing on new deals is up 15-20%. Execution and financing risk are the main unknowns; watch delivery schedule through 2028 and tenant concentration.
Catalysts
Q4 FY2026 earnings Jul 27 (FY ends May): rev ~$258.7M (vs ~$95M est; +407-532% YoY); adj EPS $0.04 (vs -$0.22 est); FY26 rev ~$611M +167% [x.com/TheTechInvest]. 1.4GW contracted CITL, >$35B base-term lease value (up to ~$86B w/ renewals), ~70% investment-grade tenants; Polaris Forge 1 (400MW CoreWeave, ~$11B) 175MW live; Forge 2 (~200MW Oracle, ~$5B) nearing fit-out; Forge 3 early construction; advanced hyperscaler talks for Delta Forge at higher pricing [x.com/matthew_sigel, x.com/APLDdigital]. Next earnings: Q1 FY2027 early Oct 2026 (TBA).
Invalidation
1) Hyperscaler lease cancellation or renegotiation at any campus. 2) Inability to refinance ~$5B debt load at manageable rates → dilution spiral. 3) Power interconnection failure at a major campus (Polaris Forge 430MW critical). 4) CoreWeave (CRWV) credit event cascading through APLD tenant base. 5) AI capex cycle inflection — hyperscalers cut back, demand for new DC capacity collapses. 6) CHRN spinoff value collapses or creates liability overhang. 7) Construction cost overruns + timeline delays push revenue beyond debt service capacity.
Latest change
· Target moved from $48.31 to $48.12.
Mapped funds and investors
Direct relationships supported by published evidence.
Reported holdings as-of
No sourced relationships mapped yet.
Disclosed investment history
No sourced relationships mapped yet.
Showing up to four relationships in each group. ETF weights describe the fund’s portfolio, not ownership of this company. Private investment history does not establish current ownership.
MIXED — institutional analysts unanimously bullish (avg target ~$72, all Buy). Retail/CT sentiment: cautious on X, seeing drawdown as buying opportunity but wary of debt load and 'AI debt bubble' narrative. Sector-wide AI infra selloff driving bearish positioning. Short interest 27% indicates significant skepticism. Zacks quantitative screen: Strong Sell (contrarian to analyst consensus).
Lower-confidence snapshotTarget price: $49.74
Dated research targetMoat & position
- Evidence Grade
- Inferred
- Moat Durability
- Capacity cycle
- Toll Road Tier
- Strong proxy
Deep research update
3,277 words · Updated 19 Oct 2026 · 11 sources
Applied Digital is a U.S.-based designer, developer, owner and operator of large-scale, purpose-built data centers engineered for HPC/AI workloads. Its "franchise" model replicates a standardized design + construction + operations team across five "AI Factory" campuses for two investment-grade hyperscalers and CoreWeave.
- Revenue: FY2026 $611.3M (+167%); Q4 FY26 $258.7M (+407%). [8-K 2026-07-27, EX-99.1]
- Profitability: GAAP net loss attributable to common -$249.2M (FY26); adjusted EBITDA +$107.2M; Q4 adjusted EBITDA +$42.4M; Q4 net operating income +$39.9M. [8-K 2026-07-27]
- Balance sheet (2026-05-31): total assets $9.93B; total liabilities $6.19B; stockholders' equity $1.72B; cash & equivalents $1.59B. [10-K FY2026, XBRL]
- Debt stack (all sourced to 8-K): $2.15B 6.750% Senior Secured Notes due 2031 (98% of par, ComputeCo 2); $1.59B 7.000% Senior Secured Notes due 2031 (par, ComputeCo 3); 9.250% Senior Secured Notes due 2030 (CoreWeave-backed); $430M committed revolver + $120M accordion (Goldman Sachs, May 2029); $300M bridge (repaid).
- Customer concentration: one customer = 59% of FY2026 continuing-operations revenue; no other customer >10%. [10-K FY2026]
- monetization model: Recurring data center hosting/colocation fees and GPU cloud services; no material one-time hardware/consumables/license. [10-K Business; 10-Q Revenue Notes] sec.gov (accession via EDGAR index)
- revenue mix: FY2024 total revenue $165.6M; Blockchain Hosting ~$127.7M (77%), Cloud Services ~$37.9M (23%). [10-K Segment/Revenue Notes] sec.gov
- who pays: Cryptocurrency miners for blockchain hosting; AI/ML enterprises and GPU cloud customers for cloud services; HPC data center tenants (e.g., CoreWeave) for leased capacity. [10-K Business; Customer Concentrations] sec.gov
- margin_value_capture: FY2024 gross margin ~16.6% ($27.5M gross profit); operating margin negative. Value accrues to owners of low-cost power/data center assets. [10-K MD&A/Revenue Notes] sec.gov
- customer classes: Data Center Operators (crypto miners), Hyperscalers (AI cloud providers such as CoreWeave). [10-K Customer Concentrations] sec.gov
Applied Digital Corporation (CIK 0001144879) is a digital-infrastructure company that designs, builds, and operates data centers for high-performance computing, artificial intelligence, and cloud services. Historically it hosted Bitcoin mining equipment; it has since pushed into GPU/HPC cloud services and HPC data-center capacity.
The company reports at least two segments: Data Center Hosting and Cloud Services.
| Segment / item | FY2024 reported figure | Share of total | Source | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | ~$165.6 million | 100% | SEC EDGAR APLD 10-K index | needs primary source validation |
| Data Center Hosting revenue | ~$110.0 million | ~66% | SEC EDGAR APLD 10-K index | needs primary source validation |
| Cloud Services revenue | ~$55.6 million | ~34% | SEC EDGAR APLD 10-K index | needs primary source validation |
| FY2023 total revenue | ~$55.4 million | — | SEC EDGAR APLD 10-K index | needs primary source validation |
The segment mix above is derived from APLD FY2024 segment disclosures, if the underlying segment figures are accurate. The exact filing citation should be the APLD Form 10-K for fiscal year ended May 31, 2024, filed approximately August 29, 2024; exact accession number must be pulled from the EDGAR index.
- Data Center Hosting: APLD leases conditioned power, space, cooling, and security to customers that operate Bitcoin miners or HPC/AI hardware. Revenue generally includes capacity/energy charges; mining contracts may include pass-through power costs.
- Cloud Services: APLD sells accelerated-computing/GPU capacity on a subscription or usage basis, targeting AI/HPC workloads.
Because power is often pass-through or consumption-linked, the gross margin profile is highly sensitive to electricity prices, utilization, and depreciation of electrical/mechanical infrastructure and GPUs.
APLD’s net income has been negative. For FY2024, reported net loss was approximately $149.3 million [needs primary source validation], per APLD annual-report disclosures. GAAP net loss is heavily affected by fair-value movements, debt-related charges, or warrant liabilities, so it should not be read as pure operating margin.
Exact gross margin, operating margin, and adjusted EBITDA are not cited here because I could not verify them to an exact primary document in this session: needs primary source validation.
The paying entities are mining operators, cloud/HPC tenants, and acquirers of AI compute. No top-customer names are repeated here because I could not directly verify APLD’s current named-customer disclosures from filings in this environment. APLD filings generally disclose customer concentration, but customer names are often redacted or described anonymously. Treat any named-customer list as needs primary source validation.
- Bitcoin mining operators — legacy hosting customers.
- AI/HPC cloud tenants — startups, enterprises, and developers that need GPU compute.
- Potential hyperscale/edge-infrastructure customers — APLD has discussed large HPC leases/LOIs in investor materials and filings, but named counterparties need verification.
- Chief information officers / AI infrastructure heads.
- Crypto mining operators seeking energy capacity.
- AI platform companies seeking GPU supply outside the hyperscaler queue.
None are named in this report because I could not directly verify APLD’s current top-customer names from its SEC filings in this environment. Do not source customer names from anonymous aggregators; verify any name against the actual 10-K/8-K exhibit.
Applied Digital Corporation is a U.S.-registered builder and operator of data centers. Its SEC filings describe the company as a provider of digital infrastructure for high-performance computing, cloud, and cryptocurrency hosting. The business is built around physical data center capacity, power contracts, and long-term tenant relationships.
APLD’s economic model is asset-heavy: it secures power, builds or retrofits data halls, installs electrical and cooling infrastructure, and monetizes the energized capacity through fixed or take-or-pay hosting contracts and GPU-service revenue.
APLD’s reportable segments, based on how the company’s 10-K/10-Q is structured, are generally:
- Data Center Hosting
- Hosts crypto-mining and other digital-infrastructure tenants.
- Monetization is often based on power capacity, uptime, and energy consumption.
- Contracts may include fixed capacity fees, energy pass-throughs, early termination fees, and service-level credits.
- Cloud Services
- Provides GPU-based cloud compute for AI, machine learning, rendering, and high-performance computing workloads.
- Monetization is based on GPU-hour, GPU-month, or dedicated-cluster subscriptions.
- This segment is more sensitive to utilization, GPU availability, and hyperscale pricing.
- HPC Hosting
- Leases fully commissioned HPC data halls to anchor tenants, often with fixed base rent and pass-through power/cooling costs.
- In some periods this may be embedded within Data Center Hosting or broken out as a separate segment as it reaches materiality.
From APLD’s filing structure, customer classes are:
- Cryptocurrency mining operators
They lease energized data center capacity to run ASIC miners.
- AI/HPC cloud customers
These can be AI model developers, research labs, startups, and enterprise buyers who need GPU compute.
- HPC anchor tenants
These may be large technology companies or AI infrastructure providers that lease dedicated data halls.
Buyer archetype by segment:
| Segment | Likely buyer type | Evidence location | Buyer name |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data Center Hosting | Crypto mining company | APLD 10-K customer concentration note | needs primary source validation |
| Cloud Services | AI/ML developer or enterprise AI buyer | APLD 10-K segment note | needs primary source validation |
| HPC Hosting | Large HPC infrastructure tenant | APLD 10-K/8-K contractual announcements | needs primary source validation |
No specific customer names are asserted because the underlying filing text was not retrieved.
FY2026 (ended 2026-05-31) revenue $611.3M, +167% YoY (FY2025 $228.6M, FY2024 $165.6M). Q4 FY2026 revenue $258.7M, +407% YoY. GAAP net loss attributable to common -$249.2M; adjusted EBITDA $107.2M; adjusted net income $36.1M. All figures from the Q4 FY2026 earnings release (8-K filed 2026-07-27).
APLD is the physical-AI bottleneck play on power + speed-to-market, not on chips. The binding constraint in the AI buildout has shifted from GPU supply to secured electrical capacity and on-schedule construction. APLD has converted secured power into 1,410 MW of take-or-pay, non-cancellable 15-year leases worth ~$36.2B, with ~$86B if all renewal options are exercised.
The physical/economic constraint is MW delivered on schedule vs. MW contracted, and the economics are build-to-suit. Worked model from public parameters:
| Metric | Calculation | Value | Source Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contracted revenue / MW | $36.2B ÷ 1,410 MW | ~$25.7M/MW (15-yr) = ~$1.71M/MW/yr | derived (10-K table) |
| Construction capex / MW | $2.15B ÷ 200 MW (ComputeCo 2); $1.59B ÷ 150 MW (ComputeCo 3) | ~$10.6–10.75M/MW | derived (note-proceeds ÷ MW funded) |
| Gross revenue ÷ capex (15-yr) | $25.7M ÷ $10.7M | ~2.4× (ex. opex, power, interest) | derived |
| Full-ramp annual contracted revenue | 1,410 MW × $1.71M | ~$2.4B/yr vs $611M actual FY2026 | derived |
| Total build capex for contracted book | 1,410 MW × ~$10.7M | ~$15.1B | derived |
| Current revenue-generating capacity | "~100 MW operating" → "175 MW live" post-quarter | ~12% of 1,410 MW live today | measured (earnings release) |
The binding constraint is therefore the ~6.3-year revenue-to-capex payback against 15-year leases — highly attractive if the MW are delivered on time, and the disconfirming signal is any delivery slippage on the 2H26–2H28 schedule.
| Parameter | Value | Source | Tier | Type | Cross-verified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Illustrative HPC capacity | 100 MW | assumed, not APLD disclosure | n/a | assumed | no |
| Illustrative colocation rate | $85/kW-month | assumed, not APLD disclosure | n/a | assumed | no |
| Utilization | 100% | assumed | n/a | assumed | no |
| Conversion | 1,000 kW per MW | arithmetic | n/a | derived | yes |
| Months | 12 | calendar | n/a | derived | yes |
If the unverified FY2024 figures from APLD filings are correct:
\[
DC\;share = \frac{110.0}{165.6} = 66.4\%
\]
\[
Cloud\;share = \frac{55.6}{165.6} = 33.6\%
\]
Inputs: needs primary source validation.
\[
\text{Switching cost} = 20{,}000 + 100{,}000 + (10 \times 1{,}643.84)
\]
\[
\text{Switching cost} = 20{,}000 + 100{,}000 + 16{,}438.40
\]
\[
\text{Switching cost per MW} = 136{,}438.40
\]
| Scenario | Relocation cost | Deposit | Lost days | Switching cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base case | $20,000 | $100,000 | 10 | $136,438 |
| No lost revenue | $20,000 | $100,000 | 0 | $120,000 |
| 30 lost days | $20,000 | $100,000 | 30 | $169,315 |
| Higher relocation and deposit | $50,000 | $200,000 | 10 | $266,438 |
| Low switching case | $5,000 | $25,000 | 3 | $34,931 |
- Even the low switching case is a meaningful one-time cost per MW.
- If a competitor offers a price discount of more than \(C_{\text{switching}}\) per MW over the remaining contract term, the tenant may economically switch.
- If APLD’s contracts contain early-termination fees, those fees would increase the switching cost further.
- This calculation is illustrative only, not sourced from APLD filings. It should not be used for APLD-specific valuation until the actual hosting revenue per MW and contract termination terms are pulled from the 10-K/10-Q.
The one bottleneck APLD controls is secured power plus hyperscaler-qualified construction execution — the ability to turn an interconnection agreement into revenue-generating MW on schedule. The 10-K states its HPC capacity is "contracted under long-term leases, including with investment-grade hyperscalers," and each lease is "structured on a take-or-pay basis, and is non-cancellable, such that a termination for convenience would require payment of the full remaining contractual value." This is a capacity/qualification moat, not an IP moat: the shell is commodity, but the power + customer trust + speed bundle is the scarce asset.
- Take-or-pay non-cancellable contract structure. $36.2B over 15-year base terms; a termination for convenience triggers payment of the full remaining contractual value — a de-facto switching cost imposed on the tenant, not on APLD.
- Qualification barrier — "design approvals from every major hyperscaler" (per CEO commentary), evidenced by three consecutive take-or-pay leases with the same "high investment-grade hyperscaler" in three different states (~$20.2B of the $36.2B).
- Vertical power integration to de-bottleneck. Working with Base Electron Corp. (IPP) + Babcock & Wilcox on ~1.2 GW of front-of-the-meter natural-gas generation in the Dakotas; APLD owns ~10% of Base Electron.
- Counterparty credit enhancement. CoreWeave leases restructured with unconditional springing guarantees + $50M letter of credit following CoreWeave's A3 investment-grade refinancing.
6 = STRONG PROXY (bypass 2 / concentration 2 / hyperscaler 2). Bypass partial (hyperscalers can self-build or use rival developers, but APLD's secured power + speed earned three consecutive leases); concentration moderate (APLD is one of many DC developers, no oligopoly pricing power); hyperscaler exposure moderate (serves hyperscalers but exposed to their self-build).
- product_service: Data center hosting (blockchain and HPC) and GPU cloud services.
- technical function: Provides power, cooling, networking, and physical security for high-density compute hardware (ASICs/GPUs); cloud service delivers on-demand GPU compute. [10-K Business; 10-Q Business] sec.gov
- why it is hard: Requires large-scale, low-cost power, advanced cooling, site development, and long-lead interconnection; capital intensive. [10-K Risk Factors] sec.gov
- substitutes: Self-mining/self-hosting, other colocation/hosting providers, hyperscale clouds (AWS, Azure, GCP), GPU cloud providers. [10-K Competition/Risk Factors] sec.gov
- pricing power: LOW/UNPROVEN — crypto hosting is commodity-like; HPC leases are long-term but early-stage. [10-K Risk Factors] sec.gov
- Turnkey data-center capacity — electrical substations, switchgear, backup/conditioned power, cooling, physical security, and network connectivity.
- GPU cloud / accelerated-computing services — remote access to NVIDIA-class GPUs for training, fine-tuning, and inference.
- HPC/AI data-center build-outs — purpose-built facilities with high power density compared with traditional enterprise colocation.
A facility receives utility-scale AC power, transforms/distributes it to racks, and removes heat through air or liquid cooling. For mining, the units are ASIC miners; for cloud/HPC, the units are GPU servers with high-speed networking.
- Build/operate data centers in-house.
- Use hyperscale clouds: AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud.
- Use rival GPU-cloud/neocloud providers: CoreWeave, Lambda, Nebius/Crusoe, etc.
- Other digital-infrastructure/mining-hosting providers: Core Scientific, Iris Energy, TeraWulf, Hut 8, Bitfarms, etc.
The moat is mostly power access, interconnection timelines, site permits, and already-built electrical capacity. If APLD has secured large power allocations and facility shells, competitors face long lead times for new capacity.
However, this does not automatically confer pricing power. Data-center and GPU-cloud supply is expanding rapidly. Pricing power should be assumed weak unless APLD demonstrates contracted rate floors, high renewal rates, and low customer churn. No verifiable market-share or pricing-power claim is made here.
APLD sells:
- Energized data center capacity
This is physical space with electrical power, cooling, networking, security, and operations. The technical unit is megawatts of critical IT load.
- Cloud GPU compute
This is access to GPUs inside APLD-operated data centers, sold as cloud instances, reserved capacity, or dedicated clusters.
- Hosted HPC data halls
This is more like an infrastructure-as-a-service lease for large tenants that need dedicated high-density data halls.
The core technical function is relatively simple to describe:
- Secure grid power through utility interconnections.
- Build medium-voltage or high-voltage electrical infrastructure to deliver power to racks.
- Install high-density cooling — often liquid cooling, rear-door heat exchangers, or immersion-capable systems for GPU clusters.
- Deploy compute hardware — ASIC miners for hosting customers or GPU servers for cloud.
- Operate the facility to maintain uptime and environmental conditions.
The harder problems are:
- Power access: Large utility interconnections require long lead times.
- Power cost: Industrial energy tariffs and curtailment obligations materially affect returns.
- Cooling density: GPU clusters can exceed traditional air-cooling limits; retrofitting older facilities is expensive.
- Capital intensity: Building or acquiring data center capacity requires substantial capital.
Substitutes include:
- Hyperscale public cloud providers: AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud.
- Other digital-infrastructure hosting companies: Core Scientific, Iris Energy, Bit Digital, TeraWulf, Northern Data, etc.
- Traditional colocation providers: Equinix, Digital Realty, CyrusOne, QTS.
- On-premise HPC clusters for customers with high utilization and long-term demand.
- For crypto hosting: miner self-mining at owned sites or foreign hosting.
APLD’s cloud service is not meaningfully differentiated from other GPU cloud providers if it merely resells GPU access. Differentiation may come from price, availability, data center location, power cost, or the ability to host dedicated large clusters.
The moat, if any, is physical and operational, not software:
- Securing multi-megawatt utility interconnections.
- Acquiring or building data halls with high-density cooling.
- Signing long-term customer contracts.
- Managing power constraints in competitive interconnection queues.
- Navigating local utility, zoning, and environmental approvals.
This is easier to replicate for well-capitalized hyperscalers and harder for lightly capitalized entrants. APLD’s advantage is expected to be speed and existing site/power pipeline, not exclusive technology.
Pricing power is likely limited:
- For crypto hosting, demand is cyclical and highly sensitive to Bitcoin price, network difficulty, and energy cost.
- For cloud GPU services, APLD competes against hyperscalers with larger capital bases, broader cloud services, and longer track records.
- For HPC hosting, tenants are large and often have alternatives; pricing is often negotiated on total cost of ownership.
APLD may be able to raise prices only if power-constrained capacity remains scarce and GPU supply remains tight. That pricing power must be tested against actual utilization and contract renewal rates. The exact evidence is needs primary source validation.
- Peers: CyrusOne, QTS, Vantage, Stack, Switch, and hyperscaler self-build (Microsoft/AWS/Google/Meta all run their own DC programs). Build-to-suit DC development is a crowded market — the differentiation claim is speed + secured power + qualification, not proprietary tech.
- Counterparty risk: CoreWeave (Polaris Forge 1, 400 MW) + two hyperscalers. CoreWeave is the single largest credit exposure; its A3 rating + guarantees partly de-risk this.
- Hyperscaler exposure: customers ARE hyperscalers; APLD does not compete with them but is exposed to their self-build / renegotiation power over renewal cycles.
- Delivery slippage: any delay to the 2H26–2H28 in-service schedule (Polaris Forge 2, Delta Forge 1/2, Polaris Forge 3) breaks the revenue ramp and the "on-time delivery = differentiator" thesis.
- 59% single-customer revenue — loss of the anchor hyperscaler (or a CoreWeave credit event) would gut contracted revenue and trigger covenant/debt stress on a $6.19B liability base.
- Financing cost/dilution: 6.75–7.0% secured notes + warrants (CoreWeave, PEAK6, Jane Street, Building 4) → heavy interest burden and equity dilution; if adjusted EBITDA cannot cover interest as capex peaks, the build-out stalls.
- Power/interconnection slippage on the Base Electron 1.2 GW gas program (permitting, utility interconnection) would cap the 1.7 GW marketed pipeline.
A thesis on APLD would likely be wrong if any of the following is true:
- LOI/pipeline conversion fails: APLD announces large HPC leases or LOIs but does not convert them into signed, revenue-generating contracts.
- GPU pricing collapses: If AI GPU rental prices fall because of overbuild or NVIDIA supply shifts, APLD’s Cloud Services segment may produce lower revenue and margin than modeled.
- Energy costs or reliability deteriorate: Since much of the business is power-linked, rising electricity prices, curtailment, or grid failures would compress hosting margins.
- Customer concentration turns negative: If APLD is dependent on one or two large tenants and a tenant cancels, fails, or fails to pay, revenue would fall sharply.
- GAAP losses continue from non-operating items: If warrant/debt fair-value losses or financing charges keep APLD deeply unprofitable, it may require repeated dilutive capital raises even if revenue grows.
- The revenue mix is not as HPC-heavy as the unverified figures suggest: If the true Cloud/HPC contribution is low and Data Center Hosting remains largely Bitcoin-exposed, the AI-infrastructure thesis weakens materially.
- Who is the "high investment-grade hyperscaler" (undisclosed)? A named anchor tenant would materially de-risk the concentration flag.
- Does adjusted EBITDA cover the ~$300M+/yr interest run-rate on the notes stack as capex peaks through CY2027?
- What is the dilutive share count post-warrants (CoreWeave/PEAK6/Jane Street/Building 4) and post-ChronoScale distribution?
STRENGTHENED (from INTACT) — revenue +167% YoY, $36.2B take-or-pay backlog, and three consecutive hyperscaler leases confirm the bottleneck; tempered by 59% customer concentration and a heavy debt/dilution load that caps the upside and widens the downside.
Sources
11 sources preserved from the latest qualified research update.
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- eia.goveia.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- sec.govsec.govOpen source ↗
- data.sec.govdata.sec.govOpen source ↗