Target
$141.66 → $159.90
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Zero Trust Security · Digital Trust
Zero Trust Security exposure in Digital Trust.
Digital Trust > Zero Trust Security > CDN-to-security conversion; Guardicore / Zero Trust edge as the attach layer
Catalysts
Next earnings (last reported 2026-08-06); security mix vs CDN mix in next 10-Q
Invalidation
Trailing EPS turns negative; security revenue mix stalls; Cloudflare/Zscaler take share of Zero Trust edge for two quarters
Latest change
· Target moved from $159.90 to $156.38.
Earlier changes
Mapped funds and investors
Direct relationships supported by published evidence.
Reported holdings as-of
| Fund / investor | As of | Fund portfolio weight | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global X Cybersecurity ETF BUG | 3.01% | Source | |
| First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF CIBR | 1.71% | Source |
Disclosed investment history
No sourced relationships mapped yet.
Showing up to four relationships in each group. ETF weights describe the fund’s portfolio, not ownership of this company. Private investment history does not establish current ownership.
ins-$7.0M · 13F 16+/9-×0.0 · short↑0.36
Current snapshotfirst-pass dt_ds_first_pass_2026-08-28; Fintel 🟡 Mixed
Lower-confidence snapshotTarget price: $148.46
Dated research targetMoat & position
- Evidence Grade
- Inferred
- Moat Durability
- Durable IP
- Toll Road Tier
- Strong proxy
Deep research update
3,919 words · Updated 19 Oct 2026 · 9 sources
All figures from Q2 FY2026 10-Q (filed 2026-08-07, quarter ended 2026-06-30) and the 8-K EX-99.1 earnings release (2026-08-06) unless noted.
- Revenue (Q2 FY26): $1,099.7M, +5% YoY (vs. $1,043.5M).
- Security: $604M, +10% YoY (now the largest revenue source)
- Delivery & other cloud applications: $396M, −6% YoY (secular decline)
- Cloud Infrastructure Services (CIS): $99M, +39% YoY
- Profitability (Q2 FY26): GAAP operating income $80.3M (7.3% margin, −47% YoY); non-GAAP operating income $271M (25% margin, −5 pts YoY). GAAP net income $79.4M (−23%); non-GAAP net income $236M (−6%). Non-GAAP EPS $1.59 (−8%); Adjusted EBITDA $416M (−6%).
- FY2025 (10-K): revenue $4.208B, +5.4% YoY (security +10%, compute +12%, delivery −5%).
- Balance sheet (06-30-26): cash + equivalents $1,480M + marketable securities $3,136M = $4.6B liquidity; total assets $15.07B; total liabilities $10.32B (up from $6.50B at year-end, driven by the $1.75B convertible notes). 144M shares outstanding.
- Capital returns: $410M buyback in Q2 (3M shares @ $134.54 avg).
- Guidance: Q3 FY26 revenue $1,105–1,130M, non-GAAP op margin 24–26%, non-GAAP EPS $1.60–1.80. FY26 revenue $4,445–4,530M, non-GAAP op margin 25–26%, non-GAAP EPS $6.40–7.05. Capex Q3 $525M (43–46% of revenue); FY26 ~40%.
Akamai sells (1) application / API / bot / microsegmentation security on a globally distributed edge, (2) content-delivery and other cloud applications, and (3) Cloud Infrastructure Services (CIS) — distributed compute sold as multi-year capacity contracts.
- monetization model: Subscription/usage-based cloud, security, and CDN services; no material one-time hardware. (10-K Business)
- revenue mix: FY2024: Security Technology ~51%, Cloud Infrastructure Services ~49%. (10-K Note 15)
- who pays: Enterprises, media/e-commerce, financial services, government, and service providers; CIO/CISO/network and developer budget owners. (10-K Business)
- margin_value_capture: GAAP gross margin ~61%, GAAP operating margin ~15% (FY2024). Value accrues in security software and edge network scale. (10-K MD&A)
- customer classes: CISOs & Security Operations, Platform & Developer Teams, Identity & Access Management Buyers, Compliance & GRC Officers
All product/customer citations are from the FY2024 10-K Business unless otherwise noted.
Akamai Technologies, Inc. is an edge-platform company that sells three principal categories of solutions: security, content delivery / delivery, and edge compute. The company’s FY2023 Form 10-K and subsequent filings are the required Tier 1 source for the financial and segment claims that normally appear in this section. My approach here is to bind each such claim to the Akamai SEC EDGAR filing index and to mark the actual figure as “needs primary source validation” because I could not open the filing in this session.
Primary source endpoint for Akamai 10-K filings:
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001086222&type=10-K&dateb=&owner=include&count=40
Access date: 2026-04-26.
The company reports under three segments in its recent annual filing: Security, Delivery, and Compute. The revenue mix by segment is critical to the thesis because the security and compute lines are intended to offset the structurally price-declining CDN/delivery business.
The following segment revenue mix should be taken directly from Akamai’s FY2023 10-K and, if available, the most recent 10-Q:
| Segment | Approximate role | Revenue share claim | Verification status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security | Web app firewall, DDoS, zero-trust, API security, abuse protection | needs primary source validation | Not independently resolved in this session |
| Delivery | CDN, media delivery, edge delivery | needs primary source validation | Not independently resolved in this session |
| Compute | Cloud computing, edge compute, Linode-based services | needs primary source validation | Not independently resolved in this session |
Akamai’s monetization model is recurring and usage-based. The company typically sells multi-year enterprise contracts, often with committed recurring revenue, overage charges, and add-on security or compute modules. This creates a mix of subscription and consumption.
From Akamai’s filings, the customer base spans multiple verticals. The 10-K typically describes customers in categories such as:
- Media and entertainment
- Gaming
- Software and SaaS
- E-commerce and retail
- Financial services
- Public sector / government
- Healthcare
These categories are examples and must be verified against the filing’s business section. Akamai does not generally disclose a full named-customer list, but it may name certain partners or reference customers in press releases, which are Tier 2 only. No specific customer names should be treated as Tier 1 unless they appear in a filed 10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, or S-1.
The primary buyer is an enterprise infrastructure or security buyer: CISO/security VPs for security products, CTO/infrastructure VPs for delivery and compute, and developers for compute/IaaS products. The sale is often direct enterprise, but channel partners and system integrators also influence purchases.
Q2 FY2026 revenue $1,099.7M, +5.4% YoY vs $1,043.5M (10-Q XBRL RevenueFromContractWithCustomerIncludingAssessedTax). Security $604M (+10% YoY, 54.9% of revenue), Delivery & other $396M (−6%), CIS $99M (+39%) — 8-K EX-99.1 2026-08-06. GAAP operating income $80.3M (7.3% margin) vs $151.5M (14.5%) a year earlier.
the DT bottleneck is the edge-distribution + telemetry that makes WAF / bot / API / Guardicore segmentation hard to rip out; CIS is a capacity-cycle adjacency that uses the same colo footprint and is competing with hyperscalers for GPUs, memory, power and racks.
The binding constraint has shifted from bandwidth/caching to physical GPU capacity + data-center power/colo space — the same scarce inputs hyperscalers are bidding up.
Worked calc 1 — edge density → latency moat. ~4,300 PoPs vs. hyperscaler ~40–60 regions. Akamai executes serverless functions within ~50 ms of ~90% of the global internet population; frontier AI inference needs sub-250 ms round-trips. A robotics customer running inference at the edge gets ~5× lower round-trip latency vs. a centralized region — the structural reason the $600M CIS deal landed.
Worked calc 2 — CIS backlog → revenue bridge. 2026 YTD multi-year CIS commitments > $2.8B vs. Q2 CIS revenue of $99M (~$396M annualized) = 7.1× coverage of the current run-rate. The single $600M / 4-yr robotics deal = $150M/yr ≈ 38% of current annualized CIS revenue from one customer. If $2.8B converts over ~4 yrs, CIS revenue approaches ~$700M/yr by 2029 vs. $99M/quarter today — the "2027 low-teens growth" guide is the first tranche of this conversion.
Worked calc 3 — cost-of-moat (capex intensity). FY26 capex guided to ~40% of revenue ≈ $1.8B on a $4.5B midpoint, vs. ~$700M historical (~15–17%). The ~$1.1B incremental is GPU + colo. It is funded by a $1.75B convertible senior note due 2032 (May 2026, with note hedges + warrants). Akamai must outbid hyperscalers for the same GPUs/power/colo — the 10-Q risk factors explicitly flag "significant increase in co-location costs … including from hyperscalers" and competitors' "priority access to servers, memory, co-location capacity and power."
- RPO step-up is the 10-Q confirmation of the CIS book. Remaining performance obligations were $7.6B as of 2026-06-30 vs $5.5B at 2026-03-31 vs $5.2B at 2025-12-31 vs $4.3B at 2025-06-30 (XBRL
RevenueRemainingPerformanceObligation). Sequential +$2.1B; YoY +$3.3B / +77%. Management expects to recognize ~40% over the next 12 months and ~40% over the next two to three years (10-Q Note 11). NTM RPO ≈ $3.04B vs FY26 revenue guide midpoint $4.4875B = 0.68× next-twelve-month coverage; total RPO / FY26 midpoint = 1.69×. - The growth increment destroyed gross profit. Q2 revenue +$56.2M YoY; cost of revenue +$59.4M ($485.9M vs $426.5M) → incremental gross profit −$3.2M. GAAP gross margin 55.8% vs 59.1% a year earlier; cost of revenue 44% of sales vs 41% (10-Q cost-of-revenue table). Incremental operating income −$71.2M.
- Network cash cost is the binding physical constraint, not software. Q2 co-location $99.5M (+14% YoY), bandwidth $53.5M (+17%), network build-out $74.4M (+28%). Combined $227.4M = 20.7% of revenue vs 18.3% a year earlier (+237 bps). The 10-Q MD&A states co-location costs have risen “particularly as competition for data center space has continued to increase, including from hyperscalers,” and that competitors hold “priority access to servers, memory, co-location capacity and power.”
- Accrual capex is already elevated, but the 09-05 40%-of-revenue FY figure is not in the 8-K guidance table. EX-99.1 accrual capex Q2 $346.5M = 31.5% of Q2 revenue (vs 19% in Q2 2025); H1 $552.9M = 25.4% of H1 revenue. FY26 guidance in EX-99.1 is revenue $4,445–$4,530M, non-GAAP op margin 24–26% (Q3) / 25–26% (FY), non-GAAP EPS $6.40–$7.05 — no capex line. Cash PPE (XBRL
PaymentsToAcquirePropertyPlantAndEquipment) H1 only $246.6M; the accrual/cash gap is the tell that GPU/colo deployments are being booked faster than paid. - LayerX is a cheap option on the Security stack, not a P&L event. 10-Q Note 6: closed July 2026 for ~$205.0M cash. May 14, 2026 PR: ~$10M year-end ARR and ~$0.12 dilutive to FY26 non-GAAP EPS. Cost-of-moat: $205M / $10M ARR = 20.5× ARR; $205M / FY26 revenue midpoint = 4.6% of one year of sales; $0.12 / $6.725 midpoint EPS = 1.8% dilution. Workforce Protector rebrand launched 2026-08-05 (IR PR, no 8-K) — Gartner cited: SEB adoption 10% → 25% of orgs by 2028.
- Balance-sheet leverage is now the CIS funding vehicle. May 2026: $1.75B 0.000% converts due 2032 + $1.75B 0.000% due 2030 (10-Q Note 7). Five series outstanding, par $7,640.0M. Carrying value current $1,705.6M + long-term $5,857.3M = $7,562.8M. Liquidity cash + marketable securities $4.616B (EX-99.1); 143.6M shares; Q2 buyback $410M / 3M sh @ $134.54.
| Parameter | Value | Source | Tier | Measured / derived / assumed | Cross-verified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security segment revenue | needs primary source validation | Akamai FY2023 10-K, SEC EDGAR index, accession pending | 1 | Measured, but pending direct verification | No — single-source until opened |
| Delivery segment revenue | needs primary source validation | Akamai FY2023 10-K | 1 | Measured, pending | No |
| Compute segment revenue | needs primary source validation | Akamai FY2023 10-K | 1 | Measured, pending | No |
| Total revenue | needs primary source validation | Akamai FY2023 10-K | 1 | Measured, pending | No |
| Gross margin | needs primary source validation | Akamai FY2023 10-K | 1 | Measured, pending | No |
| Estimated security customers | 4,000–6,000 | Assumed by analyst | N/A | Assumed | No |
| Illustrative security ACV | \$300k–\$450k | Derived from placeholder \(S = 1.8B\) | N/A | Derived, pending real \(S\) | No |
| WACC or discount rate for DCF | needs primary source validation | Not sourced | N/A | Assumed, not used | No |
Akamai controls the internet's "front door": a distributed edge network of ~4,300–4,400 points of presence and ~300,000 servers across 130+ countries that sits in front of the majority of Fortune 500 applications, processing ~2 trillion requests/day. The moat is physical distribution, not code — 25+ years of sunk colocation leases, 1,300+ network peering relationships, and deep-in-ISP last-mile placement that centralized hyperscalers (40–60 regions) cannot replicate at the same latency. The company is now converting that same distribution into (a) Zero Trust security (Guardicore microsegmentation, API security, WAF/bot management) and (b) Cloud Infrastructure Services — distributed GPU/AI-inference compute at the edge.
- Edge distribution: ~4,300+ PoPs, 130+ countries, ~700 cities (Akamai Q1 FY2026 SEC disclosure via CDN World); Akamai's own May 2026 blog cites "almost 4,400 PoPs … roughly 300,000 servers." Rivals are an order of magnitude thinner: Cloudflare ~330 cities, Fastly ~80 PoPs.
- Threat-intelligence data moat: ~2 trillion requests/day (+40% since 2024) feeds the security engine. 2026 State of the Internet report: AI bots are now 51% of global web traffic, AI bot activity +300% in 2025 — a demand tailwind for bot management / API security that only scale players can instrument.
- Security stack (acquisition-assembled): Guardicore microsegmentation (Zero Trust segmentation, blocks lateral movement), Neosec-derived API security (top-rated in 2026 Gartner Peer Insights), App & API Protector, Enterprise Application Access (EAA) / Secure Internet Access (SIA). July 2026: acquired LayerX (~$205M cash) → rebranded "Akamai Workforce Protector," adding browser-based AI-usage control + secure enterprise browser.
- Switching cost: once microsegmentation is embedded in a network and DNS/WAF/bot rules are tuned to 2T req/day of telemetry, rip-and-replace is a multi-quarter security project — the classic "integrated at the edge" lock-in.
Guardicore microsegmentation + API/WAF rules tuned on a 4,300-PoP / ~300k-server edge remain a multi-quarter switching cost (DT angle). The incremental CIS bottleneck is colo/power/GPU that Akamai does not control — the 10-Q says so in the competitive-risk language. Delivery is a declining cash cow (downward pricing on renewals, 10-Q MD&A).
Public parameter table
| Parameter | Value | Source Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Q2 FY26 revenue | $1,099.682M | measured — 10-Q XBRL |
| Q2 FY25 revenue | $1,043.494M | measured — 10-Q XBRL |
| Q2 Security / Delivery / CIS | $604M / $396M / $99M | measured — EX-99.1 |
| Q2 GAAP operating income | $80.284M (7.3%) | measured — 10-Q XBRL |
| Q2 cost of revenue | $485.932M (44% of sales) | measured — 10-Q |
| Q2 colo / bandwidth / build-out | $99.494M / $53.521M / $74.415M | measured — 10-Q cost table |
| RPO 2026-06-30 / 2026-03-31 / 2025-06-30 | $7.6B / $5.5B / $4.3B | measured — XBRL RPO |
| RPO NTM recognition | ~40% (~$3.04B) | measured — 10-Q Note 11 |
| FY26 revenue guide | $4.445–$4.530B | measured — EX-99.1 |
| Q2 accrual capex / % of sales | $346.536M / 32% | measured — EX-99.1 |
| H1 accrual capex / % of sales | $552.873M / 25% | measured — EX-99.1 |
| Convertible notes par | $7.640B (five series) | measured — 10-Q Note 7 |
| LayerX purchase price | ~$205.0M cash | measured — 10-Q Note 6 |
| LayerX YE ARR / EPS dilution | ~$10M / ~$0.12 | measured — 2026-05-14 company PR |
| CIS YTD multi-year commitments | >$2.8B incl. >$600M / 4-yr robotics | measured — EX-99.1 CEO statement |
| FY26 guided capex ~40% of revenue | not in EX-99.1 guidance table | unknown in primary 8-K — prior-note earnings-call figure, not re-cited |
Worked Calculation 1 — RPO coverage vs CIS book (the missing 10-Q number).
- Sequential RPO +$2.1B (7.6 − 5.5) vs YTD CIS commitments “over $2.8B” (EX-99.1). The 10-Q RPO is all solutions (Security + Delivery + CIS), so the +$2.1B is a ceiling on how much of the $2.8B CIS book was in-quarter incremental RPO — i.e. a large CIS commitment can sit outside RPO until infrastructure is deployable / the contract is noncancellable under ASC 606. Using management’s 40/40/20 recognition: year-1 RPO revenue $3.04B against FY26 midpoint $4.49B = 68% already contracted; years 2–3 another $3.04B. This is contracted revenue, not contracted margin. Combined with Worked Calc 2, booked growth is real and the profit on that growth is not.
Worked Calculation 2 — negative incremental gross profit (the quality-of-capture test).
- ΔRevenue Q2 = $56.188M; ΔCOGS = $59.397M; ΔGP = −$3.209M. Every incremental dollar of Q2 growth came with $1.06 of incremental cost of revenue.
- Network-cash-cost share: (colo+bw+build-out)/revenue 20.68% vs 18.31% = +237 bps, which more than explains the 330 bps GAAP GM decline (59.1% → 55.8%) once payroll/SBC/depreciation in COGS are included.
- Implication for the 09-05 CIS ROI: that calc assumed ~$1.1B incremental annual capex at 25% CIS margin → 6.9% ROI. Using filed H1 accrual capex of $553M (25% of H1 sales) rather than an unfiled 40% FY figure, the capex intensity is already high but below the 40% assumption. The margin assumption is the one the Q2 P&L falsifies: GAAP incremental GP is negative, so a 25% CIS op-margin on the next $304M of CIS revenue is not yet evidenced in the consolidated file. Treat 6.9% ROI as an upside case, not the base.
Worked Calculation 3 — LayerX cost of the moat vs the Security franchise it defends.
- $205.0M cash / $10M YE ARR = 20.5× ARR.
- $205.0M / Q2 Security annualized $2,416M = 8.5% of one year of Security revenue to buy browser-native AI-usage control + SEB.
- $0.12 dilution / $6.725 FY26 EPS midpoint = 1.8%. This is a cheap franchise-defense option (Gartner 10%→25% SEB by 2028) — not a second growth engine. It does not change CIS economics.
- product_service: Akamai Connected Cloud — edge CDN, cloud compute, and security services.
- technical function: Distributed edge PoPs cache/optimize content, route traffic, run compute, and filter DDoS/WAF/bot/API attacks.
- why it is hard: Global network scale, peering, security telemetry, and low-latency routing built over decades; high capex/ops barrier. (10-K Business; Risk Factors)
- substitutes: Cloudflare, Amazon CloudFront, Fastly, Google Cloud CDN, Microsoft Azure CDN, Imperva, F5, Zscaler.
- pricing power: MED — security/zero-trust stickiness offsets CDN price erosion vs hyperscalers. (10-K Risk Factors)
Akamai sells an integrated edge platform with three main product families:
- Security: web application firewall, bot management, DDoS protection, API security, microsegmentation, zero-trust network access, and DNS security. These are delivered from Akamai’s global edge network.
- Delivery / CDN: content delivery for web, media, software downloads, and streaming. Akamai’s edge servers cache content close to end users and optimize routing to reduce latency and origin load.
- Compute: cloud / edge computing services, including the Linode-derived infrastructure for virtual machines, Kubernetes, object storage, and edge compute workloads.
These product descriptions are consistent with Akamai’s public product disclosures and can be bound to the 10-K business description once the filing is opened. Direct product-level revenue figures should be sourced from the 10-K management discussion and segment footnote.
Akamai operates a large distributed network of servers in internet exchange points, colocation facilities, and edge locations. The technical function is:
- DNS-based routing: End-user requests for a customer’s hostname are resolved through Akamai’s DNS to an edge server close to the user.
- Caching and delivery: Static and dynamic content is cached at the edge to reduce latency and offload origin infrastructure.
- Security filtering: The edge inspects HTTP/HTTPS traffic for malicious patterns, absorbs DDoS traffic, and blocks malicious bots before traffic reaches the origin.
- Compute execution: Developers can deploy workloads on Akamai’s distributed infrastructure, reducing dependency on centralized cloud regions.
Akamai’s pricing power varies by product:
- Delivery/CDN: Pricing power is weak. CDN is commoditizing, with Cloudflare and hyperscale cloud providers offering aggressive pricing. Akamai may not be able to raise delivery prices without losing share.
- Security: Pricing power is stronger. Security products involve compliance, regulatory, and breach-avoidance considerations; customers are more reluctant to switch after integration. However, price competition from Cloudflare, Zscaler, and Palo Alto limits upside.
- Compute: Pricing power is moderate because compute is moving toward usage-based consumption and faces competition from public clouds, but Akamai’s edge differentiation can support some pricing in low-latency workloads.
- CDN/delivery: Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Azure Front Door. Delivery revenue is in structural decline (−6%) on "downward pricing of contract renewals" and DIY/cost-optimization (10-Q).
- Zero Trust / edge security: Cloudflare (Workers/Zero Trust), Zscaler (ZTNA), Palo Alto (Prisma), F5, Imperva. Akamai's differentiation is microsegmentation (Guardicore) + scale telemetry, not first-mover ZTNA.
- CIS / AI infrastructure: AWS/Azure/GCP, CoreWeave, Lambda, plus the "emerging companies providing AI infrastructure and inference solutions" the 10-Q names as new competitors. Hyperscalers hold priority access to GPUs, memory, colo and power — the explicit competitive risk in Akamai's own filing.
- Delivery revenue fails to stabilize (another quarter of −6% or worse) → the legacy cash engine keeps shrinking faster than Security + CIS can offset.
- CIS margins disappoint below the guided low-20s%: if the $2.8B commitments convert at thin margins after 40%-of-revenue capex, the pivot destroys value rather than compounds it.
- Hyperscalers extend edge PoPs (CloudFront/Wavelength/GKE-Edge) and undercut on AI-inference pricing → the latency moat compresses.
- GPU/colo input scarcity: Akamai's stated "completely sold out" GPU capacity + colo cost inflation means growth is gated by inputs it does not control; a delivery slip (like Q2's capex slipping to Q3) delays the 2027 acceleration.
- Non-GAAP op margin keeps falling (25% vs. 30% a year ago) — if the security-to-compute mix shift is structurally margin-dilutive, the "strong proxy" thesis weakens.
- Hyperscaler priority access to GPUs / memory / colo / power (10-Q risk factors) makes CIS a capacity race Akamai can lose on inputs it does not own.
- Delivery renewal pricing continues to deflate the cash engine (−6% Q2; 10-Q: “downward pricing of contract renewals”).
- Large CIS commitments are fulfillment risk: 8-K forward-looking language flags “customer’s ability to fulfill its purchase obligations,” infrastructure deployment timelines, and hardware/memory procurement.
- Convertible stack par $7.64B vs liquidity $4.62B: refinancing / dilution if the 2027 $1.15B notes (coupon 0.375%, conversion $116.18) and later series convert or are repaid in cash.
This section identifies what would prove the thesis wrong.
- Security growth stalls: If Akamai’s security segment revenue growth drops below the delivery segment’s decline, the mix shift thesis fails. The required data is segment revenue growth from Akamai’s 10-K/10-Q. Currently needs primary source validation.
- CDN pricing declines faster than traffic growth: If delivery revenue declines despite traffic growth because price-per-bit falls faster, Akamai’s delivery cash flow may shrink. Look for delivery revenue growth vs. traffic growth in the MD&A.
- Gross margin contraction: If consolidated gross margin falls below historical levels and stays below the 60% threshold, the “security mix improves margins” thesis is undermined. Verify from 10-K and 10-Q.
- Cloudflare / hyperscaler share gains accelerate: If Cloudflare’s revenue growth remains 30%+ while Akamai’s security growth remains below 15%, the competitive pressure is real. Source from Cloudflare 10-K and Akamai 10-K, cross-verified.
- Compute fails to scale profitably: If Compute segment growth is purchased with below-cost pricing or massive capital expenditure, unit economics deteriorate. Check Compute revenue growth and segment profit/loss from the 10-K segment footnote.
- Customer concentration or churn appears: If Akamai’s 10-K discloses a new 10%+ customer or a decline in large-enterprise retention, revenue quality is lower than the model assumes.
- Regulatory or data-sovereignty changes: If Akamai’s business is disrupted by data-localization rules or restrictions on cross-border content delivery, the delivery and security businesses may slow.
- Any top customer loss or major security breach in Akamai’s network: If a major breach occurs in Akamai’s own security infrastructure, the security brand premium would be impaired; this would be disclosed in an 8-K or risk factor update.
- What fraction of the $7.6B RPO is CIS vs Security vs Delivery? 10-Q does not split RPO by solution — next 10-Q / investor deck.
- Does Q3 EX-99.1 print CIS revenue materially above the $99M Q2 run-rate (robotics deal “will not materially contribute in 2026” per secondary recap — needs primary call transcript)?
- FY26 capex % of revenue: re-cite only if Q3 8-K or 10-Q prints it; do not carry the 40% earnings-call figure as filed.
Hypothesis verdict: INTACT — Security mix (55%) + RPO +77% YoY keep the DT edge-security thesis alive; negative incremental GP + hyperscaler input-priority keep it from STRENGTHENED and force economic_capture 6→5. DB thesis_status=WEAKENED with legacy ts/ec/ttm 2.8/2.0/4.0 is a writeback miss from 09-05, not a new fundamental downgrade.
Sources
9 sources preserved from the latest qualified research update.